eEXTREME

Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy

Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STANDING GROUP ANNOUNCEMENTS

Dear *e-Extreme* readers,

We hope you are well, wherever you may be. Read on for the usual mix of announcements, reports, (3!) book reviews, and alerts to keep on top of all the recent developments related to 'extremism and democracy'. *E-Extreme* includes a section with expert interviews focusing on current developments in politics on the extremes of the political spectrum. In this issue, **Manès Weisskircher** answers our questions on the outcomes of the Austrian elections, with a particular focus on the FPÖ's performance. **Aaron Winter** then discusses the recent election of Donald Trump in the United States and its implications for American politics.

Please get in touch with your contributions and ideas for the next issue and please note that the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* has a brand-new Bluesky account (@ecpr-ead.bsky.social) where you can follow us for the latest news and updates, calls for papers, and must-read publications.

Finally, we wish you all a wonderful and relaxing holiday season!

REGISTER AS AN E&D STANDING GROUP MEMBER

You can join the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* always free of charge and at the click of a button, via the ECPR website (https://ecpr.eu/Groups). If you have not already done so, please register as a member so that our list is up to date and complete.

In order to join, you will need a MyECPR account, which we assume many of you will already have. If you do not have one, you can create an account in only a few minutes (and you need not be from an ECPR member institution to do so). If you are from a non-member institution, we will need to accept your application to join, so your membership status (which you can see via your MyECPR account, and on the Standing Group pages when you are logged in to MyECPR) will be 'pending' until you are accepted. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch!

CALL FOR REVIEWERS

e-Extreme is offering scholars the opportunity to review books and articles! If you want to share your review of the latest published books or articles in the field of populism, extremism, and radicalism and have it published in *e-Extreme*, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us via: ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com.

E&D ROUTLEDGE BOOK SERIES

The Routledge Book Series in *Extremism and Democracy*, which publishes work that lies within the Standing Group's academic scope, covers academic studies within the broad fields of 'extremism' and 'democracy', with volumes focusing on adjacent concepts such as populism, radicalism, and ideological/religious fundamentalism. These topics have been considered largely in isolation by scholars interested in the study of political parties, elections, social movements, activism, and radicalisation in democratic settings. Since its establishment in 1999, the series has encompassed both influential contributions to the discipline and informative accounts for public debate. Works will seek to problematise the role of extremism, broadly defined, within an ever-globalising world, and/or the way social and political actors can respond to these challenges without undermining democratic credentials.

The series was originally founded by Roger Eatwell (University of Bath) and Cas Mudde (University of Georgia) in 1999. The editorial team now comprises Caterina Froio (Sciences Po), Andrea L. P. Pirro (Scuola Normale Superiore), and Stijn van Kessel (Queen Mary University of London). The editors strongly encourage ideas or suggestions for new volumes in the book series, both from established academics and early career researchers.

To discuss any ideas or suggestions for new volumes in this book series, please contact the editors at: ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com.

KEEP US INFORMED

Please keep us informed of any upcoming conferences or workshops you are organising, and of any publication or funding opportunities that would be of interest to Standing Group members. We will post all details on our website. Similarly, if you would like to write a report on a conference or workshop that you have organised and have this included in our newsletter, please do let us know.

Please, also tell us of any recent publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in the 'publications alert' section of our newsletter, and please get in touch if you would like to see a particular book (including your own) reviewed in *e-Extreme*, or if you would like to review a specific book yourself. We are always keen on receiving reviews from junior and senior scholars alike!

Finally, if you would like to get involved in the production of the newsletter, the development of our website, or any of the other activities of the Standing Group, please do get in touch. We are always very keen to involve more and more members in the running of the Standing Group!

UPCOMING EVENTS AND CALLS

ECPR GC2025

The CfP is open for the ECPR GC2025, which will take place at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, on August 26-29, 2025. Check out the conference website here: https://ecpr.eu/GeneralConference and submit your paper to the E&D-endorsed Section "Rethinking the Populist Challenge to Democracy", chaired by E&D's very own Annika Werner and Andrej Zaslove: https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/SectionDetails/1513

Potential panel themes for the E&D-endorsed Section:
- Cross-continental (cross-national) comparison of populism and its relationship to democracy
- New approaches to (measuring) populist and democratic attitudes
- Anti-populist sentiments and movements
- Populist answers to wicked policy problems
- Populism and social movements
- Democratic Backsliding and/or Institutional Resilience in the Face of Populism: Safeguards, Responses and/or Vulnerabilities
- Populism, Civil Society, and Democracy
- Populist Contamination of Mainstream Parties: Democratic Implications
- The Populist Challenges to Political Representation
- From Populism to Extremism? Social Cohesion Under Strain
- The Role of Media and Social Media in Amplifying Populist and Extremist Narratives
- Addressing the Roots of Populism and Extremism: Economic, Social, and Cultural Drivers
- Extremism and Populism in Times of Crisis: Case Studies from Recent Global Events
- The Relationship Between Populism, Nationalism, and Democratic Backsliding
- Civic Responses to Populism and Extremism

Deadline for paper and panel proposals: **January 6, 2025**.

VACANCIES AT IREX

The new Institute for Research on Far Right Extremism (IRex) at the University of Tübingen, Germany, is seeking to fill two PhD and two Postdoc positions with E&D's Prof. Dr. Léonie de Jonge and Prof. Dr. Annett Heft. Applications must be submitted **by January 10, 2025**.

More information here: https://uni-tuebingen.de/en/faculties/faculty-of-economics-and-social-sciences/subjects/department-of-social-sciences/research-on-far-right-extremism/news/newsfullview/article/vacancies-at-irex/

WORKSHOP ON POLARIZATION, DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING, AND THE EXPANDING GAP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC EXPECTATIONS AND OUTCOMES: LATIN AMERICA AND BEYOND

Convenors:
Javier Sajuria, Queen Mary University of London
Noam Titelman, Sciences Po
Lisa Zanotti, Universidad Diego Portales

The workshop will address the following questions:
- What is the relationship between affective polarisation and democratic backsliding?
- How are political elites shaping public perceptions of democratic outcomes, and what mechanisms do they employ to influence policy and discourse?
- How does the growing gap between citizens' expectations and democratic outcomes affect voter behaviour, political disengagement, and support for authoritarian alternatives?
- What roles do negative partisanship and anti-establishment sentiments play in contributing to democratic backsliding?
- How can we better measure democratic attitudes in ways that reflect both support for and resistance to democratic erosion?
- We encourage papers addressing a range of topics, including but not limited to:
- Comparative studies of democratic attitudes and backsliding, particularly (but not exclusive to) between Latin America and other regions.
- The role of populist and far-right elites in shaping voter behaviour and public perceptions of democracy.
- The links between polarisation, democratic expectations, and voter disengagement or apathy.
- Innovative approaches to measuring democratic attitudes that reflect susceptibility to democratic backsliding.
- The role of elites in influencing polarised discourse and delegitimizing democratic institutions.
- The impact of negative partisanship on the stability of democratic systems.

To apply, please submit a 250-word abstract by **January 15, 2025**, using this form (https://forms.office.com/e/AkXkMkT537). Successful participants will be notified by the end of January.

More information here:

https://www.qmul.ac.uk/politics/research/cgd/events/items/workshop-on-polarization-democratic-backsliding-and-the-expanding-gap-between-democratic-expectations-and-outcomes-latin-america-and-beyond.html

CALL FOR PAPERS: SPECIAL ISSUE 'THE IMPACT AND EMERGENCE OF POPULISM IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LEADERSHIP'

Guest editors: Rudolf Metz (HUN-REN, Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Political Science, HungaryCorvinus University of Budapest, Hungary) and David Elcott (NYU (retired); SUNY)

There is a general consensus among researchers that leaders play an important role in the emergence and development of populism: they lead populist parties or movements, organize mobilization, and articulate the populist worldview. The success of populist leaders rests upon the specific relationship they develop with their supporters (Barr, 2018; Casullo, 2019; Diehl, 2018; Laclau, 2005; Moffitt, 2016; Pappas, 2019; Urbinati, 2019; Weyland, 2001; cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). There have been many empirical studies of populist leaders and leadership (Andrews-Lee, 2021; Favero, 2022; McDonnell, 2016; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2011; Metz and Plesz, 2023; Michel et al., 2020; Seijts and de Clercy, 2020), yet these typically have little or no connection to leadership studies (Hartley, 2018; Sousa and van Dierendonck, 2021; Uysal et al., 2022).

The special issue seeks to bridge the discourse of political science and public management studies by inviting researchers from a wide range of theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds to engage in a collective debate and explore the relationship between populism and leadership.

Rather than focusing exclusively on a theoretical interpretation of populist leadership, it seeks to incorporate different perspectives to answer questions such as: How does populism manifest itself in leadership dynamics and processes? How does populism affect followers and their leaders in the executive and legislative branches, local governments, party organizations, and public administration? How do mainstream established actors respond to the populist challengers? What are the broader implications of populist leadership for institutions, society, and democracy?

Our specific aim is to answer these questions and to explore and assess the challenges that populism poses both to the study of political and public leadership and to the key actors of leadership (leaders and followers) and their contexts (society, institutions, and democracy). The special issue also contributes valuable insights to a better understanding of the nature, limits, and challenges of modern political and public leadership and the roles of followers and leaders in modern populist politics

List of topic areas:
- Ethical, emotional, psychological, and gender aspects of populist leadership
- Populism and charismatic leadership;
- Populism in leaders' rhetoric and communication;
- Populist leadership in different institutional contexts (executive and legislative branches,
- Political parties, social movements, local government, and administration);
- The style and repertoire of populist leadership;

- The implications of populist leadership for democracy, followers, and governance;
- The manifestations of populist leadership in different cultures and countries.

Closing date for manuscripts submission: **January 15, 2025**

This special issue, titled "The Impact and Emergence of Populism in Political and Public Leadership," will be published next year in the *International Journal of Public Leadership* (Emerald Publishing).

More information here:

https://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/calls-for-papers/impact-and-emergence-populism-political-and-public-leadership

SAVE THE DATE: INAUGURAL E&D BIANNUAL CONFERENCE 2025

In 2025, the Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* will organize its inaugural biannual E&D conference in collaboration with Queen Mary University London. The CfP will be published soon—for now please do save the date!

Date: **June 9-10, 2025**
Place: London
Conference theme: Radicalism and Populism

EXPERT INTERVIEWS

AFTER THE AUSTRIAN ELECTIONS: THE PERFORMANCE OF FPÖ

Manès Weisskircher
REXKLIMA, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany

1. **Scoring 28,8 percent, the far-right party FPÖ came in as the strongest force. How do you explain its electoral success?**

It is indeed striking that the FPÖ managed to reach first place just five years after the embarrassing Ibiza scandal where party leader Strache, at the time of the video's release also Austria's vice-chancellor, had a few drinks too many and discussed shady deals with what he thought was the niece of a Russian oligarch. Back then, many expected the FPÖ to enter a long-term period of crisis.

To be sure, the FPÖ already recovered from past scandals. Also, the party has been an electorally strong force since the 1990s – in fact, it received almost 27 percent of the vote already in the 1999 general election. At that time, however, the mainstream parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), were still stronger than they are today. This time, due to the increasing fragmentation of the political landscape, the FPÖ's result is sufficient for it to emerge with a relative majority of votes.

The context of the 2024 election was highly favorable to the FPÖ: Similar to Germany, Austria is about to experience a second (!) consecutive year of GDP decline. Migration remains a salient issue. We know from the political science literature that both economic insecurity and a high public salience of migration is beneficial to far-right electoral success. Furthermore, the center-left SPÖ is in a difficult condition, unable to gain votes despite, like the FPÖ, being in opposition. Moreover, the governing center-right ÖVP won big time at the last election in 2019, back then still with Sebastian Kurz, who infamously ran on an anti-immigration campaign. Kurz resigned in 2021 after his own fair share of scandals. Therefore, the strength of the far right is also a consequence of the weakness of its competitors- who either did an underwhelming job in government in the context of crisis (center right), or who did not manage to convince voters of their alternative visions in opposition (center left).

2. **What will be the far right's role in this new parliamentary term?**

As things stand now, the FPÖ will be the main opposition party at the national level – and an increasingly important government actor at the regional level. At the national level, the FPÖ will consistently highlight its first-place finish in the September 2024 election, portraying any coalition government without them as illegitimate. At the moment, the center-right ÖVP, the center-left SPÖ and the liberal NEOS negotiate the country's very first three-party government since 1947. Additionally, the FPÖ will strongly criticize the Austrian president, a former leader of the Green Party, for not inviting the FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl to lead the post-election coalition negotiations. In short, it's not going to be pretty.

3. **After "Ibizagate", a corruption scandal involving key FPÖ politicians and an alleged Russian oligarch in 2019, the party was not part of Austrian governments anymore. To what extent has the far right been normalized (again) since then?**

Despite some interesting conceptual attempts in political science, the term "normalization" has remained somewhat blurry. In Austria, the FPÖ has never been fully included nor completely excluded from the political mainstream. In the past decades, both the center-right ÖVP and the center-left SPÖ have cooperated with the FPÖ at various political levels, including in coalition governments. At the regional level, the FPÖ has continued to be part of governing coalitions with the ÖVP even after the Ibiza scandal of 2019. By now, ÖVP and FPÖ coalitions at the regional level are regular sights. Some leading SPÖ figures also do not rule out a potential regional coalition government with the FPÖ.

Ironically, the increasing strength of the FPÖ has prompted the ÖVP leadership to recently reject the idea of a national-level coalition with the FPÖ. This stance is clearly driven more by strategic considerations than by any deep-seated normative objection to the "normalization" of the FPÖ. In a coalition with the stronger FPÖ, ÖVP Chancellor Karl Nehammer would likely lose his position. However, in a potential coalition with the SPÖ and NEOS, he could maintain his role as head of government.

4. **Which implications does the strength of FPÖ have beyond Austria?**

In an international comparison, the FPÖ has transformed from a unique early case to just another example of broader trends in Western European political systems and beyond. Organizationally, the FPÖ has played a key role in fostering far-right cooperation in the European Parliament. For two decades, it has been behind several, sometimes short-lived, attempts to form a united group within the European Parliament. It has also been a driving force and founding member of the new far-right "Patriots for Europe" group, which is now the third largest in the European Parliament. The first international guest of the new president of the Austrian Parliament, an FPÖ politician, was Viktor Orbán. His party Fidesz is a key player of the newly established Patriots.

5. **In some cities and regions in Austria, the communist KPÖ has recently scored electoral successes, but it received only 2,4 percent at national level. How do you explain its electoral failure?**

While the radical left's national result is not impressive, it is the best national-level KPÖ result since 1962. So far, though, the KPÖ success has been a local and regional phenomenon. It started in Graz, in Austria's second-biggest city, when the party started to focus on affordable housing and direct social help in the 1990s and managed to rise to 20 percent already by the early 2000s. Currently, the KPÖ holds the mayor office in Graz – and has remained a peculiar case of radical left-wing politics in western Europe because it managed to make an impact in local government and has been outperforming the far right at the local level for many years. By now, such cases are increasingly hard to find even in some of the radical left's traditional stronghold countries in southern Europe. Recently, the Austrian

Communist Party has also had some success in Salzburg. But the party lacks the nation-wide organization, media coverage, and winning messages to gain more support at federal elections.

6. **In the light of recent developments in your field, what are the questions that researchers of 'Extremism and Democracy' should focus from now on?**

I'm afraid that our research subject will remain empirically important for years to come, which is why there are so many relevant research questions that the scholarly community needs to focus on. Fortunately, many colleagues from all career stages have so many creative ideas for studying interesting aspects of this important field. In my view, three issues are of particular importance:

First, I would like to stress that the far right increasingly manages to effectively mobilize in the context of 'new' publicly salient issues. In many countries, a relevant example is far-right opposition against climate politics. Effective climate action is a challenge of utmost importance but very difficult to achieve, yet contemporary far-right parties further complicate the situation by increasingly mobilizing against climate action. The potential for long-lasting damage is obvious here. In my own research group in Dresden, REXKLIMA, we examine the urgent issue of far-right politics in the context of climate change.

Second, we must continue to explore the far right beyond the issue of traditional party politics. Not only is social movement protest important, but online activism and the networks of social media and "alternative" media are also crucial. While the left has not been particularly effective in this regard, the far right has proven highly successful in leveraging these platforms. I wonder: why? And what's the impact of all that on voting behavior – and people's minds?

Third, and perhaps most importantly, we need to better understand which policies help to counter the rise of the far right. If we view their electoral success also as a consequence of a lack of political output, we must learn what mainstream parties should deliver in order to shift voters away from far-right forces.

AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

Aaron Winter
Lancaster University, United Kingdom

1. **Donald Trump was the first to win another non-consecutive term. How can we make sense of this rebound?**

Trump is the first Republican to do so, but Grover Cleveland, the 22nd and 24th President and the first Democrat following Civil War period, was the first. I know that was not the point of the question, but I wanted to deny Trump the bragging rights (although he may do so anyway. It would not be the first time). In another connection, like Cleveland, a pro-business liberal, Kamala Harris sought to get more support from those in the centre and on the right uneasy about Trump. Unlike him though, she was unsuccessful and even lost votes compared with Biden in 2020. I think that the liberal Democrat establishment initially assumed Biden's defeat of Trump in 2020 was definitive and that January 6th (along with legal cases against him) signalled his end as a political force. This was not the case and led to complacency within the party where alternatives to Biden and the status quo were undermined and not considered until it was too late. Even then, Harris did not offer anything significantly different. Her campaign replayed the centre-right strategy offering both the status quo and reactionary politics in a more liberal and acceptable form instead of questioning what Biden's win actually meant, and offering no hope, political horizon or alternative aside from and beyond beating Trump. This helped undermine the left and foreclose on any serious opposition or alternative. This and the fact that Trump won again seem to show that this was not just a rebound for Trump, but continuity without serious reflection or long-term strategy for the Democrats. We are seeing a lot of analysis attributing Trump's win to immigration, wokeness and white working-class support (represented as 'the economy') and the Democrat failure to chase this. If the Democrats fail to see the flaws in this narrative and take no real lessons from the loss, they will likely replay the same strategy again and again with, at best, only temporary electoral success and greater harm to those who are at the scapegoated and targeted by both parties, but not represented. That is the real division and threat to democracy.

2. **How did the American far right develop after Trump's defeat in 2020 and the January 6 Capitol attack?**

Many thought that the defeat of Trump in 2020 would leave the far right either demoralised and in decline or more extreme and a greater threat. January 6th seemed to support the latter, but perhaps some believed that revelations about Trump's role to those who might find his actions to be anti-American (insofar as it could be collapsed with the democratic process and rule of law) would help finish the job. If that didn't do it, they always had the new National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, but that would greatly underestimate how mainstreamed and emboldened the far right had become. The fact that liberals and the Democrats seemed to buy into and affirm right-wing narratives around immigration, wokeness and the white working class, only further legitimised a far right that felt both they and Trump were in the right and being unjustly

persecuted, strengthening both their sense of righteousness and victimhood. The far right has a history of using this to their advantage and adapting to both mainstreaming and marginalisation. While the National Strategy targeted the far right and strengthened their sense of persecution and victimisation, it also targeted the left in ways that undermined it. The construction of equivalence between the two was seriously flawed in that it could not tell the moral difference between fascist and anti-fascist or racist and anti-racist, nor account for the asymmetry of power and political representation between these. The fact that the left was undermined by the Biden administration and liberals became complacent after Trump's defeat, allowed the far right time and space to theorise conspiracies, consolidate interests and enemies, strategise, organise and mobilise with encouragement from Trump and right-wing media and free reign on Elon Musk's X, without any serious resistance or challenge.

3. **How did these developments affect the intra-party mechanisms of the Republican Party?**

I think this helped the Republicans, particularly more far-right elements, if you consider Trump and Trumpism key to their success and defining the Party now and for the foreseeable Future. I can't imagine it will become more moderate at this rate. The more moderate or traditional elements may be negatively affected, but they still beat the Democrats and hold power. There were initially 'Never Trumpers', but many fell into line during his first term and most criticism of him following January 6th also gave way once his candidacy in 2024 was established. The charges against him may even have played a role mobilising support and loyalty, and attacks on 'disloyal' Republicans such as former VP Mike Pence and Liz Cheney, the latter of whom the Democrats seemed to see relish getting support from. They seemed to think that if they could get white working-class voters and support from moderate conservatives who thought Trump was too extreme, they could potentially win. This wildly underestimated the power of perceived persecution on the right, mainstreaming of the far right, radicalisation of the Republican Party, and risks rejecting the left and not securing their own base. They not only seemed to think that they needed to fight on Trump's terms and compete for right-wing, centrist and swing voters, but appeared unable to define and differentiate their platform on immigration and the economy beyond 'not as woke as Trump says, and not as bad as Trump is'. They also looked increasingly ill-defined and insecure because of how Biden performed and needed to be replaced late in the day. The irony being that despite the chaos, there was continuity and reaffirmation of the centrist and capitalist status quo under Harris. It was not only Biden's strategy in 2020, but it goes back to Clinton's New Democrats (or possibly even Cleveland). Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans fell in line with Trump (and crossed over that line many times over). There is no reason to believe that this will change as it is a winning strategy in the battle of ideas, if not always elections. In some ways, the ideas matter more as they affect society, the political discourse and electoral opposition too.

4. **What were Trump's strategies during his presidential campaign?**

I think that Trump and his campaign were confident that they had a solid base, set the terms of debate, moved the 'overton window' and had the competition worried, so could ramp up the rhetoric to even more extreme and fascistic levels.

At the same time, it meant that Trump could de-emphasise his multiple scandals, first term failures and wedge issues that he had already won on, such as abortion. It may not have started that way being under indictment and against an incumbent who beat him last time. Yet, Trump's ability to operationalise and maintain the role of persecuted underdog and political alternative was also one of the narratives and terms of reference that he was able to establish and operationalise (with the help of the media), even while being President, influential, defending the racial, gender and capitalist status quo, wealthy, competitive in the poles, and appearing more robust than Biden. Trump's pseudo populist 'left behind' class politics, which were about whiteness more than anything, but furnished his underdog and alternative narratives, could also be used to address Biden's economic failures and the cost-of-living crisis in ways the Democrats could not articulate effectively. They were widely seen as elitist, woke, middle class and a failure on the economy and Harris carried her administration's baggage on this (whether true or not). So, while the Democrats were chasing conservatives, centrists and moderates who may have disliked Trump, many of these also accused the Democrats of being woke and far left on racism, transgender rights, immigration, the economy, and allegedly Israel, as well as being uninspired by the continuity they represented, leading them to vote for Trump, a third party or abstain. This left Harris without a secure base, clear counter-narrative or real response to serious social, political and economic issues and crises. There were of course other factors that played a role in the election, including those to do with the economy, electoral system, voter engagement, race and gender, but these were often integrated into or obfuscated by such narratives and strategic responses to them.

5. **During the Trump presidency we saw significant political and social resistance to his policies and strategies. Do we see something similar today, either from mainstream or non-mainstream actors?**

Yes, Trump's first term saw protest and resistance from Antifa, Black Lives Matter (BLM), and other movements and activists. In official political circles, we saw the emergence of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (or 'The Squad'), including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib, all of whom were elected to the House of Representatives in 2018, as well as Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush in the 2020 elections. Despite left, progressive and liberal opposition to Trump and support being expressed for BLM at least, it did not hold. This was partly due to internal party power and liberal distrust of more radical movements and figures, as well as Islamophobia, racism and sexism, which Harris also experienced and undoubtedly played a role in the election. When it came time to nominate a Presidential candidate and support Biden, the liberal-centrist status quo became the main or only legitimate form resistance could take. Sanders was seen as too left-wing and unable to represent the white working class so would lose to Trump. This development and intense attacks on left anti-fascist and anti-racist activists from Trump and later Biden when he included many of them in his *National Strategy*, served to undermine real radical resistance and introduce a period of self-congratulatory complacency in the liberal mainstream who also bought into the right's caricature of and opposition to 'wokeness' and the 'far left', which was compounded by the demonisation and securitisation of pro-Palestinian protestors who would be labelled antisemites and extremists. At many points, it seemed that the Democrats and Republicans

were on the same side. It should thus come as no surprise that serious opposition to Trump on the streets, in the Democrat Party and at the voting booth were impacted. This is not to blame the left, but the liberals and the Democrat establishment for fearing them and change more than Trump, as well as not providing hope and an alternative to those at the sharp end of inequalities beyond more moderate racism and a culture war that distracted from a class war neither party could afford. With four more years of Trump and an emboldened far right in and beyond the US, now is the time for reflection and support for serious resistance, opposition and democratic representation.

6. **What questions should scholars focus on after the USA Presidential Election**?

I think it depends on the discipline, focus and normative or ontological assumptions, but generally, the first thing is to challenge the white working class 'left behind' narrative to explain far-right radicalisation and support. It is repeatedly shown to be false, classist, failing to understand or address actual material inequalities, and legitimising far-right narratives and racism. Look at other constituencies, forces and factors behind far-right mobilisation and mainstreaming, and at the racialised working class at the sharp end of state, systemic and far-right racism. Second, stop treating the far right, Trump or other extreme individuals as a proxy for racism and threats to liberal democracy or positioning the latter as a bulwark against these. Look at mainstreaming, liberal, mainstream, systemic, structural and institutional racism and inequalities, as well as the problems in the mainstream and liberal democracy itself. Third, don't treat anti-racists and anti-fascists as equivalent to the far right or an obstacle to fighting them, nor racists and formers as the source of primary knowledge. Look at the role of anti-racist and anti-fascist movements and racialised communities in addressing social problems, including racism and the far right. Finally, challenge the whiteness, Euro-American ethnocentrism of the field. Look at work from the Black radical and anti-fascist traditions, the Global South, and the impact of European and American imperialism and foreign policy in ways that are racist and enable fascism. That should also help answer the question many have about why many care about what is happening in Gaza and why it was a factor in US elections.

CONFERENCES REPORT

REPORT ON THE ECPR GC2024 E&D SECTION: THE MANY CONTEXTS OF RADICALISM, POPULISM, AND EXTREMISM: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE TRANSNATIONAL

By section co-chairs Sabine Volk*, Anita Nissen**, and Vincent Dain***
*University of Passau, Germany
**Aalborg University, Denmark
***Sciences Po Rennes, France

Like in the past years, the ECPR GC2024 featured a large and lively section endorsed by the SG 'Extremism and Democracy'. Taking place at the University College Dublin (UCD) in August 2024, the section offered a forum for scholars at all career stages working on issues related to radical, populist, and extremist challengers of democracy. Embracing theoretical and methodological pluralism, it gathered panels and papers focusing on diverse topics, including anti-democratic and anti-pluralist discourses and ideologies, individual-level attitudes, party and movement action forms, organization, strategies, as well as the impact of political mobilizations on and beyond the 'mainstream'.

In addition to the SG's general themes and questions, this year's E&D Section sought to draw particular attention to notions of 'place', which have become increasingly salient in the context of the 'mainstreaming' and normalization of various forms of political radicalism and extremism across the globe. Today, populist actors exercise pressure not only on national parliaments, but on all levels of political decision-making: from local to regional and from national to supranational contexts. Radical actors have diversified, and now involve a broad array of organizational forms that campaign at different levels of democratic polities. At the same time, scholars have noted the spread of extremist attitudes within and across populations, marked by important regional and national variations.

Answering our call, we received far more than 100 paper proposals, including five pre-structured panels, for the ten panels allocated to us. Fortunately, the usual 'mismatch' between a very high number of paper/panel proposals and a comparatively low number number of allocated panels was less worrying than in the past years. This was probably due to this year's thematic focus on right-wing movements in the Section endorsed by the ECPR SG 'Participation and Mobilisation', chaired by Kathleen M. Blee and Manuela Caiani. In the many hours of discussion following the submission deadline in January, we sought to build thematically coherent panels with the most promising papers. Moreover, we aimed for our paper selection to reflect the thematic and methodological diversity of the SG's membership and beyond. In the process, we paid particular attention to including papers featuring non-western case studies and comparisons, and we gave preference to early career scholars. Aiming at the lowest rejection rate possible, we reached out to other Section chairs to relocate some papers.

The ten panels in the finalized Section program then covered a diverse array of issues from right-wing to left-wing radicalism and extremism, from subcultural and movement to party actors, from popular attitudes to party strategies, from local to transnational perspectives, and from quantitative to qualitative-interpretive approaches. Like in previous years, the panels were heavily dominated by papers related to forms of right-wing extremism, while few focused on the far left, mirroring the political landscapes in most European countries and beyond. The panels were characterized by a high level of interdisciplinarity, involving researchers and approaches beyond political science such as anthropology, human geography, media studies, and sociology. As well as focusing on the notion of place, several panels emphasised the growing importance of transnational processes in the study of the far right in terms of ideologies, strategies and modes of communication. Political communication was also one of the themes running through the section, from the visual performance of populist actors to the exploration of virtual spaces and online communities of the far right.

Due to the diversity of papers and panels we describe above, it is close to impossible to draw some overall conclusion on the current state of research on 'Extremism and Democracy' in the context of the SG. Yet, one striking (but not surprising) observation was the strong representation of 'our' themes across European political science, most clearly demonstrated in the focus on the radical right by the 'Participation and Mobilisation' Section, which is usually dominated by research on progressive movements. Relatedly, we may expect the debate on mainstreaming and normalization—also prominently featured in our Section—to become even more important in the upcoming years. The links forged by far-right groups across borders, in Europe and beyond, will also deserve our full attention in a context of reshaping alliances in the wake of the 2024 European elections, and perhaps even more so after Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election.

Last but not least, we want to thank all presenters, chairs, and discussants for their outstanding work and collegial cooperation to make this such a rewarding experience. Hopefully see you at ECPR GC2025 at Thessaloniki University!

REPORT ON THE WORKSHOP JOINTLY ORGANISED BY THE E&D AND LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS ECPR STANDING GROUPS: FAR RIGHT EXTREMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

By co-organizer Daphne Halikiopoulou
University of York, UK

The ECPR Standing Groups on Extremism and Democracy and Latin American Politics joined forces to submit a successful 'Grant Development Fund' application in 2023, and after a year of planning, their grant-supported workshop took place, aimed to ignite long-term collaboration between the groups and research areas. Specifically, the main aim of the workshop was to advance the comparative study of far-right extremism in the two regions and serve as a first step towards the creation of an enduring research network which will advance collaborations, contribute to the internationalisation of our Standing Groups research agendas, spearhead Equality, Diversity and Inclusion priorities and advance knowledge exchange in academia and beyond.

The event started on September 11th at Panteion University with a round table discussion between Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Vasiliki Georgiadou on whether the far right is a global phenomenon.

You can watch the event on Youtube here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfJNMk8ynBI

The discussion is forthcoming as an 'Exchange' article in the journal *Nations and Nationalism*.

Photo of the Roundtable:

It was then followed by a two-day workshop on September 12th-13th at the Greek National Center of Social Research (EKKE). Seven panels addressed several themes, including the supply and demand-side dimensions of far-right extremism; citizens' support for undemocratic behaviour; the end of far-right exceptionalism; responses to the far-right; foreign policy; data and methods; and emerging debates on the study of the far-right. Presenters included Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Lisa Zanotti, Carlos Melendez, Mariana Mendez, Talita Tanscheit, Yanina Welp, Robert Huber, Leonie de Jonge, Andrea Hoffman, Vasiliki Georgiadou Lamprini Rori, Katerina Iliou, Maria Pontiki and Sofia Typaldou.

Photo here:

BOOK REVIEWS

ELIZABETH PEARSON. "EXTREME BRITAIN: GENDER, MASCULINITY AND RADICALISATION."
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 2024. 280 PP. £45.00. ISBN: 9781787389465

Desislava Bocheva
Institute for Digital Security and Behaviour, University of Bath, UK

In Extreme Britain: Gender, Mascuilinity and Radicalisation, Elizabeth Pearson redefines discussions about the role of gender in radicalisation, arguing for a more nuanced gendered analysis. She contends that radicalisation is a masculinities project, and current simplistic definitions of extremism omit the role of gender and patriarchal structures in driving identity-based exclusionary actions. Pearson extends Berger's (2018) previous definition of extremism as "The belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile exclusionary action against an out-group" proposing a gendered definition of extremism as: "The distinction of in-group and out-group through perceptions of conflicting gender and sexual norms. The belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile exclusionary action against an out-group and mobilising an in-group masculinity system of prescribed masculinities and femininities into action." (Pearson, 2023, p. 262). This definition of extremism reflects the increased attention on gendered analyses of radicalisation and extremist movements in the last twenty years (Margolin & Cook, 2024). It includes gender policing, sexual violence, and within group conflict, providing a more comprehensive account of women's participation and addressing gaps in how extreme behaviour is perceived.

The book draws on thirty-one interviews with leaders and members of the far right (English Defence League (EDL), Britain First), al-Muhajiroun (ALM), a radical Islamist group, and their associated networks. While this research took place in 2016-2018, Pearson attempts to situate these findings by discussing recent research on gendered perceptions of extremism in this area. However, the absence of discussion of gender-based radicalisation and extremism, as explored by research on the 'manosphere' in recent years (Baele et al., 2023; Farrell et al., 2019) is poignant. Pearson acknowledges this, arguing that gender-based explorations of radicalisation often conflate gendered analysis with analysis of violence against women. However, discussions of the role of gender in radicalisation would be enriched by the review of research on the 'manosphere'. Interestingly, Pearson's key argument is that misogyny is rarely the reason for extremist mobilisation in these movements, but instead constitutes the cultural context that enables radicalisation. She contends that the process of radicalisation is driven by perceptions of gendered difference with the target outgroup, encouraging extreme action. These are valuable findings, and it is apparent that varied masculinity projects enable radicalisation across both the far right and ALM, albeit with distinct applications. While the book focuses on the role of gender within these two movements, this analysis could benefit from comparisons with explicitly gender-based extremist movements, exploring how

broader cultural misogyny fuels radicalisation and drives the rise of gender-based extremist movements.

The interviews with members and often leaders of extremist movements including Anjem Choudary, Jayda Fransen, and Tommy Robinson are the main fascination of this book. While there has been a shift towards collecting primary data from members of extremist movements, difficulties in accessing these populations have limited prior research to interviews with former extremists or examination of secondary materials (Ebner et al., 2023; Khalil, 2019; Scrivens, 2024). Furthermore, Pearson argues that security studies have often failed to apply a gendered analysis to radicalisation, instead focusing primarily on how movements target women. In contrast, the interviews in Extreme Britain provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how gender is employed across different extremist movements in the process of radicalisation. This research inevitably raises questions of ethics and reflexivity like: Should we give extremists platforms to express their views? What are the safety concerns for researchers? Can we truly be objective? Yet Pearson navigates this well, using an empathetic feminist approach, critically reflecting on these questions, highlighting considerations for researchers wishing to collect primary data.

The book is split into two main sections, discussing interviews with the British far right (EDL and Britain First) as well as the ALM network. In the radical right, masculinities are tied to local spaces, emphasizing working-class identity and football culture. Multiple masculinity frames are employed for validation but can also cause tension and drive subgroup formation. For ALM, masculinities are situated through navigating public space, reflecting on difficulties of assimilation, and reconstituting gender in a global context. ALM members discuss struggling to reconcile Islamic and British secular gender roles, with the movement being perceived as a path to redemption. Both groups mobilize masculinities to serve their objectives, but ALM uniquely incorporates intellectual pursuits into its masculine identity. Pearson's analysis emphasises how gender perceptions shape group boundaries and drive extremism across different ideological frames.

The presence of women as members and leaders in the radical right is explored, but the lack of information on women in ALM is apparent in a subsequent absence of a similar analysis. The exploration of the complex role of women within the radical right is fascinating, highlighting their significant departure from traditional far-right ideologies. The radical right, unlike its extreme-right counterparts, allows women in leadership positions, provided they do not challenge the underlying patriarchal structure. Leaders such as Jayda Fransen and Anne Marie Waters are interviewed and Pearson explores the disruptive effect of women's presence, noting the bargaining and compromises made to accommodate women's participation. Pearson notes that women's involvement with these movements represents a gendered transgression, focusing on women as intruders in a masculinist movement, but falls short of explaining men's role in admitting them. This analysis highlights the internal contradictions of the radical right, offering valuable insights into the movement's recruitment strategies and ideological flexibility. The author also notes the difficulties in accessing women in ALM due to greater restrictions on their role in and ability to speak for the movement. While some women were interviewed for the ALM section, it is apparent that there were less women available, which limits the

comparative analysis of women in the different movements to their presence or lack thereof.

Extreme Britain provides a nuanced gendered analysis which highlights radicalization as a project of masculinities that are produced and mobilized to serve group objectives. Elizabeth Pearson demonstrates how these movements employ masculinity systems to facilitate exclusion and reinforce pariah femininities, while also highlighting women's participation and strategies for navigating extreme spaces particularly in the radical right. A key insight is the interplay of multiple, sometimes conflicting masculinities with complementary hegemonic femininities. However, a comparison with misogynistic movements and further exploration of sexuality within extremist movements would enrich the analysis. Nevertheless, this work is a significant contribution to our understanding of gender dynamics in radicalization processes, challenging conventional narratives and opening new avenues for research in radicalisation.

Desislava Bocheva is currently completing a PhD at the University of Bath School of Management and is a member of the Institute for Digital Security and Behaviour. Her research focuses on multigroup membership and identity in online communities. She employs mixed methods, interdisciplinary approaches to study radical online spaces as well as conspiracy theories, misinformation, and collective action.

References
Baele, S., Brace, L., & Ging, D. (2023). A diachronic cross-platforms analysis of violent extremist language in the incel online ecosystem. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *0*(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2161373
Berger, J. M. (2018). *Extremism*. MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262535878/extremism/
Ebner, J., Kavanagh, C., & Whitehouse, H. (2023). Assessing violence risk among far-right extremists: A new role for natural language processing. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *0*(0), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2236222
Farrell, T., Fernandez, M., Novotny, J., & Alani, H. (2019). Exploring misogyny across the manosphere in Reddit. *Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science*, 87–96. https://doi.org/10.1145/3292522.3326045
Khalil, J. (2019). A guide to interviewing terrorists and violent extremists. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *42*(4), 429–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1385182
Margolin, D., & Cook, J. (2024). Five decades of research on women and terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *0*(0), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2357178
Roose, J. M., & Cook, J. (2022). Supreme men, subjected women: Gender inequality and violence in jihadist, far right and male supremacist ideologies. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *0*(0), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2104681
Scrivens, R. (2024). Examining online behaviors of violent and non-violent right-wing extremists during peak posting days. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *0*(0), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2347860

VAUGHAN, ANTONIA, JOAN BRAUNE, MEGHAN TINSLEY AND AURELIEN MONDON (Ed.). "THE ETHICS OF RESEARCHING THE FAR RIGHT: CRITICAL APPROACHES AND REFLECTIONS"

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2024. 424 PP. £100.00. ISBN: 9781526173874

Julius Schneider
University of Oxford, UK

Every once in a while, a book appears where the reader thinks "surely there must already be a wealth of readily available research on the topic". Surprisingly, in a field as saturated and prominent as far-right studies, ethical considerations on studying its phenomena of interest have been discussed mainly in recent years. While certainly many scholars in their everyday practice have internally reflected on pressing questions - how positionality can impact research, how researcher safety can be enhanced, or how we should engage with extremist research participants, the volume "The Ethics of Researching the Far Right - Critical Approaches and Reflections", edited by Antonia Vaughan, Joan Braune, Meghan Tinsely, and Aurelien Mondon now offers a wealth of reflective and distinctly critical contributions in 32 chapters. While before, scholars often had to travel the lonely path of researching and engaging with the far right by themselves, the volume presents a comprehensive starting point and a place of solace for the multi-faceted dilemmas, challenges, and painful experiences that come with researching the far right.

The book is made up of 6 parts. In (1) "What's in a name", contributions highlight that word choices matter and are rarely neutral, often constructing the object of investigation. (2) "Positionality, standpoint, and intersectionality" covers the researcher's placement within the field and wider society, as well as how our experiences impact our work. (3) "The haunting past: memory and far-right studies" allows researchers from various disciplines to reflect on uses and abuses of the past and the continuous political struggles about its meaning. (4) "Care and Safety" contains powerful reflections about the multi-faceted dangers and their unequal distribution for researchers of the far-right, offering brutally honest moments of learning from lived experiences that often come from (5) "Complications of engaging far-right participants and formers". Here, the reader finds different perspectives on which level and from which mindset to meet research subjects and how this might clash with how funders and review boards wish these encounters to take place. Lastly, (6) "Activism and dissemination" collects views on the role of advocacy within research on how and for which purposes we conduct and present our research.

A constant point of reflection revolves around the methodological whiteness in the field and the difficulties that come with working in a straight, white, male-dominated field. At least four overarching attempts at overcoming methodological whiteness can be delineated. This involves considering racism as the dominant form in which social relations in our society are organised and not as an exceptional occurrence. From this follows an impossibility to stay neutral towards our research subject, meaning scholars have the obligation to pick a position precisely because we need to challenge the conception that we are living in post-racial societies. In order to research our subject ethically, we need to be

aware of our privileges and how that impacts accessibility and analysis. Finally, research has a duty to defend and be in solidarity with those at the sharp end of injustices and safeguard those researchers whose risks are highest in engaging with the far-right while having the most at stake. Indeed, multiple chapters highlight the need for universities to provide structural support systems for researchers and to especially safeguard those in direct or mediated contact with the far right who are further at danger to be trolled and heckled by reactionaries, the wider public, or, at times, UK government officials. Contributions show how inadequate current support systems are, how ethical review boards can create epistemological harm, and are inadequately prepared to assess the protection of researchers from marginalised groups.

The chapters are to the point and succinct, starting with a concrete problem situated within a researcher's wider field of interest, reflecting on how that problem was dealt with and how authors might now tackle it differently or what wider learning follows. I was surprised by how the authors, skilfully in the small space available to them, were able to cover ethical considerations as much as informative and convincing research on the far right, resulting in a wealth of knowledge present beyond ethical and practical considerations. In that vein, I learned much about topics I knew very little about, like the mainstreaming of far-right ideology in Columbia or considerations about the accessibility of archives related to antifascist struggles. It is surprising how little repetition is in the book, which is impressive given the conscious decision by the editors to create shorter chapters to include more perspectives. This approach absolutely worked, yet, at times, I wanted the chapters to be a bit more in a conversation with one another because the points raised were so interesting, e.g. when contributors consider with which attitude to meet far-right collaborators in the field, whether empathy should or cannot be given?[1]

The book is of help to - and draws from the experiences of - both established scholars and early career researchers, the latter of whom arguably have more at stake when engaging with and being challenged by institutional structures like ethical review boards or constricted space in academic publications requiring ECRs to rehash accepted wisdoms – e.g. on who can and cannot be called "fascist". What is clear is that the book encourages researchers to *trust their instinct*, write what they think is right and not what the academy and performance measures think is right, while being aware of the multi-layered privileges that impact such decisions. But at the same time, it reminds the reader to continuously *question one's instinct*, positionality, word choices, specific parts of a phenomenon that one is investigating and not others, how we relate to our field of study, and how that impacts our analyses. Indeed, this stance is reflected when the editors consider the book a starting point as opposed to a handbook with actionable recommendations that can be taken over unreflected. Such an approach would go against the basic convictions of many chapters in the volume.

---

[1] Though clearly this is practically very difficult. Luckily, there is an accompanying webinar series on the book, organised in collaboration between the Reactionary Politics Research Network, the Centre for Alternative to Social and Economic Inequalities, and the Centre for Research on Extremism which precisely tries to tie up and discuss important or contentious issues stemming from the book chapters. For more information and catch-up recordings of the webinars see https://reacpol.net/.

In that sense, I could not help but feel that the volume can work as a lighthouse. Sailing the seas of far-right research can be a treacherous undertaking, full of risks that are rarely talked about. But the book can shine a light on those dangers and help scholars navigate them. Yet, every instance of research and every passage is unique and needs to be navigated contingently. But now there is also a lighthouse, in fact an emerging community of lighthouses along the shore, that can make you feel less alone.

Julius Schneider is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford. His research is inspired by discourse theory and he studies processes of meaning-making broadly considered. One research strand revolves around the mainstreaming of the far-right, with particular attention to the case of Germany and the AfD. He tries to understand how far-right viewpoints became acceptable in large parts of the population through a focus on the role of language and the media. Other research interests revolve around crisis governance, political economy, and participatory research.

MOORE, SAM AND ALEX ROBERTS. "THE RISE OF ECOFASCISM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FAR RIGHT"

Elsa Holm
Uppsala University, Sweden

'Plant more trees, save the seas, deport refugees'. These words could be found on a sticker campaign by the American Identity Movement (AIM), a now dissolved neo-Nazi white supremacist organisation. However, extreme right actors are not the only ones to refer to ecology in their campaigns: in addition to AIM, a spokesperson for the French radical right party, *Rassemblement National,* said in the lead-up to the European elections in 2019 that "The best ally of ecology is the border" (Moore and Roberts 2022, 59).

In their book "*The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right*", Sam Moore and Alex Roberts (2022) give a contextual explanation of how and why far-right actors employ an ecologic approach in their political objectives, by dissecting the concept of ecofascism and illustrating how environmental and fascist arguments intersect in far-right movements' ideological agendas. The authors explain that far-right ecologism involves "[...] forces that seek to produce and enforce racial hierarchies in and through natural systems." (Moore and Roberts 2022, 16). Moreover, they explain that nature is a proxy for racial hierarchy and the world order: nature becomes a means for protecting the white race.

Moore and Roberts explain that, at the moment, there is no single far-right nature politics – thus, 'ecofascism' is not portrayed as a single political movement. Instead, it functions as an umbrella term. They divide the far-right environmentalists into three categories: environmental authoritarianism, younger far-right and fascist movements, and ecofascist terrorists. These groups have different conceptions of what the 'nature' means and thus how climate breakdown should be solved. However, they converge in their ways of combining environmentalism with far-right ideas, such as xenophobia, racism and nationalism. The authors state in the introduction chapter that the purpose of the book is not to focus only on fascism, but to provide an opposition to racialised power exercised over and through the environment. In essence, they contend that climate change constitutes a critical issue that cannot be effectively addressed through the far-right authoritarianism inherent in ecofascism.

The authors use a combination of historical analysis and an examination of contemporary far-right movements to map out the intersection of environmentalism and far-right ideologies. They investigate the roots of far-right environmentalism and fascism, including how ecological rhetoric was used in Fascist Italy, and moves on to how similar narratives are prevalent in the rhetoric of contemporary far-right movements. Throughout five chapters, they give a coherent historical elucidation of fascism and far-right ecologism, as well as an in-depth description of how ecofascism is manifested today and what the future might hold for far-right environmentalist actors. Commenting on important subjects such as ecofascism and deadly violence, like the Christchurch shooter who killed 51 Muslims in 2019, the way far-right ecologism is propagated on social

media, and fascist ideas such as racial biology and colonial nature-management, the authors give a in-depth explanation of the concept of ecofascism and its consequences for contemporary political discourse. They amplify their argument by demonstrating the different approaches of far-right ecologism advocates. In particular, they discuss and exemplify denialists such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, two right-wing political actors that deny the existence of climate change; non-denial denialists such as Marine le Pen and Viktor Orbán that recognise climate change but frame it through nationalist and xenophobic frames; and environmental authoritarians such as China's Xi Jinping who exploits the climate crisis to pursue authoritarian policies.

Instead of focusing solely on environmentalist *or* far-right actors, Moore and Roberts explain the specific concept of ecofascism, where the two are intertwined, a topic that is still overlooked in the research field. The book yields important questions for further research on the subject, including how far-right actors utilise climate change for authoritarian, racist and white supremacist purposes. In a world subject to climate change, where climate mitigation and adaptation is no longer just the preserve of green parties, but of most parties occupying various positions on the political spectrum, understanding the different ideological approaches to climate change is of great value for a constructive discourse on the topic. Moreover, as far-right movements are on the rise, not least in Europe where German's *Alternative für Deutschland,* France's *Rassemblement National,* and Italy's *Fratelli d'Italia* all gained increased support during the 2024 European elections, an elaborated perception of the intersection between the far right and ecologism is important for further research on the topic of climate change and the political actors related to it. Moreover, understanding this phenomenon could provide insights on how to prevent far-right actors from using the dire climate situation to gain support for their anti-democratic agendas.

Moore and Roberts discuss the topic of ecofascism in an accessible language, with clear sub-topics and definitions of complex concepts. As the authors devote an entire chapter to history of both fascism and its intersection with ecologism, the book gives a comprehensive overview of the concept, and the reader is thus not required to have extensive knowledge on the topics prior to reading, in order to understand their claims. The book adds a beneficial addition to the bookshelf of non-academic public, as well as to social science scholars and students.
The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right has a wide geographical context, even including actors such as China's Xi Jinping, who is not generally considered far-right or fascist. Although his climate policies are examples of environmental authoritarianism, which is what Moore and Roberts discuss in the chapter in which he is referred to, the exemplification appears somewhat arbitrary. Considering the lack of previous research on the far right and ecologism though, the analysis and exemplification do add important topics to the scholarly debate and contribute to a comprehensive foundation for further research on ecofascism as a legitimate concept.

Despite some critiques regarding the scope of examples, the book succeeds in highlighting the dangers of allowing authoritarian and fascist ideas to set environmental agendas. By uncovering the ecofascist strategies of far-right movements, policymakers can develop climate policies that are both effective and aligned with principles of equality and human rights.

Elsa Holm is a graduating student in Development studies at the department of Government at Uppsala University in Sweden. Her thesis examines the nexus between different EU bodies and their diverse migration frames. She is about to start her internship at the United Nations Association of Sweden.

References
Moore, S., & Roberts, A. (2022). *The rise of ecofascism : climate change and the far right.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

PUBLICATIONS ALERT

Our publication alert is based on a semi-automated search and can never be complete. Therefore, please tell us about any **recent** publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in our newsletter.

Ammassari, S. (2024). Deterrent or Stimulus? How Perceived Societal Stigma Affects Participation in Populist Radical Right Parties. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241234527

Angelucci, D., Carrieri, L., & Conti, N. (2024). Party-Based Sovereignism in EU Countries: Main Patterns and Their Justification. Government and Opposition. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.47

Angelucci, D., Rojon, S., & Vittori, D. (2024). Do populist parties promote direct democracy? An empirical assessment in 29 countries in the last two decades. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2296748

Arter, D. (2024). 'When in Rome do as the Romans do' or 'Rome is for Romans only'? How the search for a classification of the Finns Party could clear a way through the taxonomical jungle of the European far-right. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241227526

Arzheimer, K. (2024). Identification with an anti-system party undermines diffuse political support: The case of Alternative for Germany and trust in the Federal Constitutional Court. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241237493

Ausserladscheider, V., Bair, J., Schmidt, V. A., Schnyder, G., Feldmann, M., & Morgan, G. (2024). Review Symposium: Business and Populism: The Odd Couple? By Magnus Feldmann and Glenn Morgan. European Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00451-8

Balcells, L., Tellez, J. F., & Villamil, F. (2024). The Wars of Others: The Effect of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Spanish Nationalism. Journal of Politics, 86(1), 352-357. https://doi.org/10.1086/726939

Bankov, P., & Venizelos, G. (2024). Populism in Power: Discourse and Performativity in SYRIZA and Donald Trump. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299241227781

Bee, C., & Chrona, S. (2024). Radicalism, identity construction and emotionality in social movements: #BogaziciDireniyor and the challenge to authoritarianism. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2023.2297077

Bellè, E., & Faury, F. (2024). Going Local, Going Mainstream? Ethnographic Study of Two French Cities Governed by the Rassemblement National. Government and Opposition. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.4

Benczes, I., & Orzechowska-Waclawska, J. (2024). Governing the Economy Under Populist Rule: The Cases of Hungary and Poland. Problems of Post-Communism. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2023.2301085

Bernhard, L. (2024). The 2023 Swiss federal elections: the radical right did it again. West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2303277

Bessen, B. R. (2024). Populist Discourse and Public Support for Executive Aggrandizement in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231223738

Borwein, S., Bonikowski, B., Loewen, P., Magistro, B., & Lee-Whiting, B. (2024). Who Can Assert Ownership Over Automation? Workplace Technological Change, Populist and Ethno-nationalist Rhetoric, and Candidate Support. Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09914-0

Börzel, T. A. (2024). Regionalism and liberal nationalism in the European Union. A case Sui Generis? Journal of European Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2321987

Carvalho, J. (2024). Les Identitaires' Impact on French Foreign Policy During the 2015 Crisis of the European Asylum System. Geopolitics, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2024.2390961

Chan, K. M., & Stephenson, L. B. (2024). Using MI-LASSO to study populist radical right voting in times of pandemic. Research & Politics, 11(1), Article 20531680241228358. https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680241228358

Chua, Y. T. (2024). "We Want You!" Applying Social Network Analysis to Online Extremist Communities. Terrorism and Political Violence. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2024.2304800

Curanovic, A. (2024). The Keeper of the Imperial Body: The Russian Geographical Society as an Entrepreneur of Imperial Nationalism. Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2024.15

Curini, L., Moffitt, B., & Zulianello, M. (2024). The Colors of the Populist Radical Right: The Strategic Use of Hue and Saturation in Party Logos. International Journal of Press-Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241229216

Dancygier, R., Dehdari, S. H., Laitin, D. D., Marbach, M., & Vernby, K. (2024). Emigration and radical right populism. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12852

Daniel, W. T., Frelin, E., Robert, M. V., & Rowley-Abel, L. (2024). Individual drivers of toxicity in radical right-wing populist legislative campaigns. West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2311040

Davis, B., Goodliffe, J., & Hawkins, K. (2024). The Two-Way Effects of Populism on Affective Polarization. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237453

della Porta, D., Parks, L. R., & Portos, M. (2024). Social movements and Europeanisation: framing 'responsibility' and 'responsiveness' in times of multiple crises. Journal of European Public Policy, 31(4), 1100-1125. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2309196

Dewantara, J. A., Budimansyah, D., Darmawan, C., Komalasari, K., & Atmaja, T. S. (2024). Religion, nationalism and foreign policy. Discursive construction of new Turkey's identity. National Identities. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2024.2324496

Drangsland, K. A. (2024). Speaking Racism - Raciolinguistic Frontiers, Worth and Belonging in the Governing of Refugees in Norway. Geopolitics. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2024.2321175

Dunkel, M. & Schiller, M. (2025). Popular Music and the Rise of Populism in Europe. Routledge.

Echeverria, G., & Finotelli, C. (2024). Much ado about nothing? Giorgia Meloni's government and immigration. Contemporary Italian Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2024.2330805

Eder, F. (2024). The nature of a populist and radical-right foreign policy: Analysing the freedom party's participation in the right-wing Austrian government. British Journal of Politics & International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481231224265

Ekström, M. & Patrona, M. (2024). Authoritarian Populism and the Challenges for News Journalism: A Discourse Approach. Routledge.

El Haddad, Z. C. (2024). Emergence of Islamophobia in VOX's political discourse. Politica Y Sociedad, 61(1), Article e83415. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.83415

Elad-Strenger, J., Ben-Shitrit, L., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2024). Mainstreaming democratic backsliding: The role of gender stereotypes. European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12667

Elsässer, L., & Röth, L. (2024). Fiscal implications of the populist radical right in power. Journal of European Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2314248

Enli, G. (2024). Populism as "Truth": How Mediated Authenticity Strengthens the Populist Message. International Journal of Press-Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612231221802

Enyedi, Z. (2024). Illiberal conservatism, civilisationalist ethnocentrism, and paternalist populism in Orbán's Hungary. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2296742

Espinosa, A., Janos, E., Pacheco, M., Cisneros, R., Cueva, F., De La Lama, R. D., & Vera, A. (2024). A qualitative study on the social representations of populism and democracy in Peru. Frontiers in Political Science, 6, Article 1306060. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1306060

Ferenc, K., & Benczes, I. (2024). Economic policies of populist leaders: a Central and Eastern European Perspective. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2317068

Fölsch, M., Dolezal, M., Heinisch, R., Wegscheider, C., & Werner, A. (2024). Cue-taking, populist attitudes, and support for holding a referendum: evidence from survey experiments. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2297507

Geese, L. (2024). Tough Positions, Trustful Voters? How Mainstream Party Position-Taking on Immigration Shapes Political Trust and its Impact on Far-Right Voting. Government and Opposition. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.6

Gherghina, S., & Mitru, B. (2024). Too little, too vague: How populist parties talk about deliberation in Europe. Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957241231803

Gillespie, L. (2024). On the proximity of the far right and the misuses of the 'mainstreaming' metaphor. Identities, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2024.2442197

Giurlando, P., Wajner, D. F., & Chryssogelos, A. (2024). Euro-Mediterranean populism: navigating populist foreign policy around the Mare Nostrum. Comparative European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00376-y

Goldberg, A. C., & Plescia, C. (2024). Election integrity across Europe: who thinks elections are held fairly and why? European Political Science

Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773924000055

Goodger, E. (2024). 'Civic' vs. 'non-civic': a comparison of individual-level support for the UK's pro-Brexit and Scotland's pro-independence nationalism. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2308413

Haynes, J., Omer, A., & Lupo, J. (2024). Religion, Populism, and Modernity. Confronting White Christian nationalism and racism. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241227523

Heinze, A. S. (2024). Drivers of radicalisation? The development and role of the far-right youth organisation 'Young Alternative' in Germany. International Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231221961

Heisler, B. S., Rhodes-Purdy, M., Navaree, R., & Utych, S. (2024). The Age of Discontent: Populism, Extremis and Conspiracy Theories in Contemporary Democracies. Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12966

Herman, L. E., & Lorimer, M. (2024). Dancing with the devil? Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen and the articulation of a new political divide in France. Nations and Nationalism. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13001

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Bakker, R., Jolly, S., Polk, J., Rovny, J.,...Vachudova, M. A. (2024). The Russian threat and the consolidation of the West: How populism and EU-skepticism shape party support for Ukraine. European Union Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165241237136

Ivanov, D. (2024). Left authoritarianism and positional shifts of populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe. East European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2024.2303712

Jacobs, K. (2024). Have a little faith in deliberation? Examining the effect of participation in a citizens' assembly on populist attitudes. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2296725

Jacobs, L., Close, C., & Pilet, J. B. (2024). The angry voter? The role of emotions in voting for the radical left and right at the 2019 Belgian elections. International Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231224524

Johnston, A. (2024). So Right It's Wrong? Right Governments, Far Right Populism, and Investment Risk. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231223742

Jones, C., Roberts, S., & Robards, B. (2024). White Warriors and Weak Women: Identifying Central Discourses of Masculinity in Neo-Nazi Telegram Channels. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2024.2318813

Kaltwasser, C. R., Salas-Lewin, R., & Zanotti, L. (2024). Supporting and rejecting the populist radical right: Evidence from contemporary Chile. Nations and Nationalism. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13015

Karavasilis, L., Custodi, J., & Chazel, L. (2024). How Do Radical Left Parties Frame the Nation? A Comparison Between Greece, Spain and France. Partecipazione e conflitto, 17(3), 717-738.

Katsourides, Y., & Ioannidis, N. (2024). The radical left and its political communication. An examination of the campaign activities of radical left candidates in sixteen Europe countries. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241238876

Katsourides, Y., & Savvides, L. (2024). Radicalization to the right, secular (ish) pandemic politics and the normalization of the Greek Cypriot far right. Nations and Nationalism. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12999

Kaya, A., & Bee, C. (2024). Introduction: social movements and radicalisation in Europe. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2332311

Kerr, S., & Lecours, A. (2024). The political consequences of the end of nationalist violence: the Basque Country and Corsica in comparative perspective. French Politics, 22(1), 3-23. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-023-00234-z

Kim, S., & Mondon, A. (2024). From Objectivist Bias to Positivist Bias: A Constructivist Critique of the Attitudes Approach to Populism. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231225403

Kiratli, O. S., & Schlipphak, B. (2024). Populism and public attitudes toward international organizations: Voting, communication, and education. Review of International Organizations. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09526-z

Kleinert, M. (2024). Parliamentary Status and Drivers of Sympathy for the Radical Right. Swiss Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12591

Knüpfer, C., & Hoffmann, M. (2024). Countering the "Climate Cult" - Framing Cascades in Far-Right Digital Networks. Political Communication. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2024.2332762

Kübler, D., Strebel, M. A., & Marcinkowski, F. (2024). Populism and the scales of statehood. Localism and populist attitudes in Western Europe. European Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773923000395

Lotta, G., Thomann, E., Fernandez, M., Vogler, J., Leandro, A., & Correa, M. G. (2024). Populist government support and frontline workers' self-efficacy during crisis. Governance-an International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12851

MacLean, N. (2024). Warn Voters About the Radicalism Beyond Trump. New Republic, 255(3), 20-21.

Madariaga, A. G., & Riera, P. (2024). The nationalisation of subnational elections in polarised Spain: the May 2023 regional and local elections. South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2023.2298556

Mahon, A., & White, J. (2024). Gender mainstreaming in counter-terrorism policy. Building transformative strategies to counter violent extremism. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 17(1), 150-152. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2307112

Makarychev, A., Terry, G. S., & Siva, S. (2024). Finno-Ugric Identity in Estonia: Visual and Discursive Analysis. Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 52(2), 251-271. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2024.7

Malesevic, S., Uzelac, G., Carol, S., & David, L. (2024). Plotting against our nation: COVID-19, nationalisms, and conspiracy theories in five European countries. National Identities, 26(2), 141-171. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2023.2288970

Malet, G. (2024). The activation of nationalist attitudes: how voters respond to far-right parties' campaigns. Journal of European Public Policy.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2311737

Mariani, G. (2024). Anti-Gender Politics in the Populist Moment. International Feminist Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2024.2314095

Matsunaga, M. (2024). Are right-wing populists more likely to justify political violence? European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12668

Matthews, N. (2024). By their friends shall ye know them: Donald Trump and the Democratic Unionist Party's populist revival. Irish Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2024.2319609

Meier, A. A. (2024). Whiteness as expertise in studies of the far right. Critical Studies on Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2321649

Melito, F., & Zulianello, M. (2024). Populist Visual Communication: A State-of-the-Art Review. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299241292575

Meyer, J. M. (2024). "The People" and Climate Justice: Reconceptualizing Populism and Pluralism within Climate Politics. Polity, 56(2), 252-274. https://doi.org/10.1086/729277

Meyerrose, A. M., & Watson, S. (2024). The Effects of Import Shocks, Electoral Institutions, and Radical Party Competition on Legislator Ideology: Evidence from France. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123423000662

Miró, J., Altiparmakis, A., & Wang, C. D. (2024a). The short-lived hope for contagion: Brexit in social media communication of the populist right. West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2325785

Montecchio, L., & Griffini, M. (2024). The Politics of Memory in the Italian Populist Radical Right. From Mare Nostrum to Mare Vostrum. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299241228090

Newth, G. (2024). 'Talking about' the far right and common sense. A case study of Matteo Salvini's buon senso trope on Twitter (2018-2023). Acta Politica. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-023-00327-1

Niu, Z. Y., & Feng, C. L. (2024). The Inter- and Transnational Politics of Populism: Foreign Policy, Identity and Popular Sovereignty. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241234514

Nociar, T., & Struhár, P. (2024). No school of hard knocks: education policies and ideologies of Slovak far-right parties. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2302050

Oskolkov, P., Lissitsa, S., & Lewin, E. (2024). 'The non-dormant beast': Antisemitism in communities of Russian nationalists on Vkontakte. Nations and Nationalism. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13013

Otova, I. (2024). Bulgarian Populist Euroscepticism: The Unavoidable Russian Dimension. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299241228097

Otova, I., & Staykova, E. (2024). Antiestablishment populism in Bulgaria: mainstreaming in the digital era. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2308105

Pilet, J. B., & Gherghina, S. (2024). Populism and alternative models to representative democracy. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2307092

Pérez-Rajó, J. (2024). Does Populism Fuel Affective Polarization? An Individual-Level Panel Data Analysis. Political Studies.

https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224579

Ramos, A., Pereira, C. R., Soboleva, N., & Vaitonyte, M. (2024). The impact of far-right political orientation and cultural values on conservative attitudes toward life and death in Europe: a multilevel approach. Frontiers in Political Science, 5, Article 1159916. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1159916

Ramos-González, J. (2024). All roads lead to Rome? Analysing the electoral performance of populist radical left parties in Europe (2008-2018): a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2311205

Rodon, T., & Rodríguez, I. (2024). A bitter victory and a sweet defeat: the July 2023 Spanish general election. South European Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2024.2326300

Ryabinska, N. (2024a). The framing of politics in a Ukrainian comedy show: a populist appeal? Post-Soviet Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2024.2331925

Ryabinska, N. (2024b). The framing of politics in a Ukrainian comedy show: a populist appeal? Post-Soviet Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2024.2331925

Scheiring, G., Serrano-Alarcón, M., Moise, A., McNamara, C., & Stuckler, D. (2024). The Populist Backlash Against Globalization: A Meta-Analysis of the Causal Evidence. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123424000024

Schneider, J. (2024). Demands as the black box of discourse theory: the German integration debate, demanding a 'leading culture' and the mainstreaming of the far-right. Critical Discourse Studies, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2024.2367623

Seddone, A., & Zulianello, M. (2023). Perceptions of populist radical right mainstreaming as a threat to democracy: evidence from Italian voters. South European Society and Politics, 28(4), 499–523. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2024.2372930

Sendra, M., & Marcos-Marne, H. (2024). Is Milei a populist? People and market in the new radical right in Argentina. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2311982

Silva, P. C., & O'Brochta, W. (2024). Gendered ideologies, gendered perceptions: do nationalist symbols and gender affect people's perceptions of politicians? Politics Groups and Identities. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2024.2308823

Simsek, C. (2024). Voices unheard: How feelings of inefficacy fuel populism. Comparative European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-024-00378-4

Syvak, N., & Cremer, T. (2024). The Godless Crusade: Religion, Populism and Right-Wing Identity Politics in the West. Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299241227784

Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2024). Euroscepticism and anti-establishment parties in Europe. Journal of European Integration. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2329634

Söderlund, P., & Grönlund, K. (2024). Can a change in the leadership of a populist radical right party be traced among voters? The case of the Finns Party. Scandinavian Political Studies, 47(1), 23-46. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12263

Sümeghy, D. (2024). Spatial spillover effects associated with the Sweden Democrats' growing support. Scandinavian Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12268

Theuwis, M. I., & Kindt, R. (2024). Through the looking glass: the effect of participation in a participatory budget on citizens' populist attitudes. European Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773923000413

Ulusahin, Y., Mavor, K., & Reicher, S. (2024). A political psychology of the link between populist beliefs and compliance with COVID-19 containment measures. Frontiers in Political Science, 6, Article 1279798. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1279798

Unal, D. (2024). The variety of anti-gender alliances and democratic backsliding in Turkey: fault lines around opposition to "gender ideology" and their political implications. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 26(1), 6-30. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2023.2299701

van de Wardt, M., Sobolewska, M., & English, P. (2024). Ethnic minority MPs as reputational shields? How Western European political parties respond to public opinion shifts on immigration policy. European Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s175577392400002x

Vlandas, T., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2024). Jihadist Terrorist Attacks and Far-Right Party Preferences: An "Unexpected Event During Survey Design" in Four European Countries. Perspectives on Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592723002980

Voeten, E. (2024). The Energy Transition and Support for the Radical Right: Evidence from the Netherlands. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237468

Vogler, D., Rauchfleisch, A., & Schwaiger, L. (2024). The System Is Corrupted, and the Mainstream Media Is Lying to us! Exploring the Relation Between Affinity Toward Conspiracy Myths and Alternative News Media Usage. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 36(1), Article edad044. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edad044

Völker, T., & Gonzatti, D. S. (2024). Discourse Networks of the Far Right: How Far-Right Actors Become Mainstream in Public Debates. Political Communication, 41(3), 353-372. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2024.2308601

Weyland, K. (2024). Why Democracy Survives Populism. Journal of Democracy, 35(1). https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2024.a915348

Wondreys, J. & Zulianello, M. (2024). Choosing who to hate? The Extreme and Radical Right's Foreign Policy between Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Russophilia. Swiss Political Science Review, 30, 486–499. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12633

Yakir, A. (2024). Making 'the people' behave: the economic policies of the Israeli anti-populist 'change' coalition. Contemporary Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2307100

Yakir, A., Navot, D., & Filc, D. (2024). The political economy of populists in power, between policy and polity: Evidence from the Israeli case. Capital and Class. https://doi.org/10.1177/03098168241232373

Zhai, Y. D. (2024). Populism, Collective Narcissism, and Support for War. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 36(1), Article edae007. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edae007

e-EXTREME MANAGING EDITORS

Audrey Gagnon, *University of Ottawa*
agagnon2@uottawa.ca

Lazaros Karavasilis, *University of Bremen*
lkaravas@uni-bremen.de

Sabine Volk, *University of Passau*
sabine.volk@uni-passau.de

E&D STEERING COMMITTEE

Léonie de Jonge, *University of Groningen*
Daphne Halikiopoulou, *University of York*
Annika Werner, *Australian National University*

http://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/extremismanddemocracy/
ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com